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At the time of  writing, the world faces an unprec-
edented pandemic of  the coronavirus disease 
(Covid-19). The outbreak, first identified in China 
in November–December 2019, rapidly spread to 
the rest of  the world. It was officially recognised 
as a pandemic on March 11, 2020 (World Health 
Organization, 2020). While the most obvious 
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need for scientific research concerns the develop-
ment of  cures or vaccines, psychological science 
clearly has a role to play in facilitating behavioural 
changes (IJzerman et al., 2020; van Bavel et al., 
2020). An increasing number of  governments 
have imposed severe measures suppressing sev-
eral constitutional rights, the most stringent form 
being national quarantine (or lockdown). Such 
lockdowns usually imply restrictions of  move-
ment for the population, except for necessity, 
work, and health circumstances, as well as tempo-
rary closure of  schools and nonessential shops 
and businesses. These so-called nonpharmaceuti-
cal interventions can be very effective in limiting 
the spread of  the virus. However, their effective-
ness in democratic countries depends strongly on 
whether citizens comply (see Islam et al., 2020; 
May, 2020; Rotondi et al., 2020; West et al., 2020).
The present research aims to investigate indi-
vidual and group factors influencing the willing-
ness of  individuals under lockdown to fully 
comply with governmental restrictions. More 
specifically, drawing on previous theory and 
research on the roles of  trust and concern as 
drivers of  behavioural intentions (Abrams & 
Travaglino, 2018), we investigated the interactive 
effect of  Covid-19 concern and political trust on 
willingness to comply. We hypothesise that both 
high levels of  political trust and high levels of  
concern should independently be sufficient to 
sustain compliance, but individuals who have 
lower levels of  both trust and concern should be 
demotivated to comply—a condition of  distrust-
ful complacency. We now describe these variables 
in turn.
Complying With Restrictions Out of 
(Self-)Concern
It is uncontroversial to expect that people would 
be more willing to change their behaviour when 
they are more concerned about the current situa-
tion. The general positive impact of  concern on 
behaviour change has been identified across 
domains, for instance, for environmental (Rhead 
et al., 2015), health (Iversen & Rundmo, 2002), or 
organisational behaviour (Rundmo & Hale, 2003). 
Citizens are more likely to comply with govern-
mental regulations when they have higher con-
cerns regarding the issue at stake (e.g., Chmutina 
et al., 2014), as well as when they perceive the 
measure as serving a self-interest. For example, tax 
compliance is greater amongst individuals who 
believe they personally benefit from the tax system 
(Wenzel, 2002). In the environmental domain, 
drivers are also more likely to respect proenviron-
mental regulations (in this case: turning off  their 
idling engine) when presented with persuasive 
messages highlighting self-interests (van de Vyver 
et al., 2018). Importantly, behaviour can be driven 
both by self-concern or by concern about one’s 
group or country broadly speaking. For example, 
people’s willingness to get vaccinated was found to 
increase both when they were personally at risk 
(i.e., self-concern) and when they were worried 
about protecting vulnerable others (i.e., other-con-
cern; Vietri et al., 2011; see also Abrams & 
Travaglino, 2018, for the impact of  national con-
cern about social issues). In addition, in times of  
global crisis such as mass tragedy or natural disas-
ter, people can experience “identity fusion” with 
their group, so that the border between the per-
sonal and social self  tend to fade (Segal et al., 
2018), and self-concern and other-concern become 
highly intertwined. Hence, in the context of  
Covid-19, we expect that people with greater con-
cerns about the pandemic (both for themselves 
and others) should be more willing to comply with 
governmental restrictions. Of  greater consequence 
is that people who feel relatively less concerned 
about the pandemic might be less motivated to 
comply with restrictions, potentially endangering 
their own and others’ lives and jeopardising the 
collective endeavour to control the spread of  the 
virus.
The Role of Political Trust in Compliance 
With Restrictions
Even individuals who feel unconcerned about the 
virus may be motivated by another factor—their 
trust in their political leadership, which could be 
sufficient to mitigate any personal complacency. 
Political trust refers to the faith people have in 
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their government (Levi & Stoker, 2000) and, as 
such, represents a form of  diffuse support for 
the authorities (Easton, 1975). Literature on 
group processes shows that stronger group iden-
tification entails a more positive perception of  
other group members, notably as more honest 
and cooperative and thus more trustworthy 
(Brewer & Silver, 1978). Interpersonal trust hence 
depends, to an extent, on shared social categori-
sation (Brewer, 1981). By extension, political 
trust also depends on the perception of  a shared 
identity with the political authority (Tyler & 
Degoey, 1995). In consequence, political trust is 
usually higher for citizens sharing party affiliation 
with the leadership (Hooghe & Oser, 2017; Pew 
Research Center, 2010), who also express greater 
satisfaction with the policy alternatives provided 
by this leadership (Levi & Stoker, 2000).
However, political trust cannot be reduced to 
political partisanship. First, some authors have 
suggested that punctual voting decision (e.g., vote 
for a specific presidential candidate) was a better 
predictor of  political trust than ongoing political 
partisanship, as those do not necessarily align 
(Citrin, 1974). Second, political partisanship can-
not explain the downward trends in political trust 
that have been observed in several countries over 
the past decade despite changes in the adminis-
trations and political parties in charge (e.g., 
Hetherington, 2005). Other factors such as resur-
gence of  political scandals or cynical messages 
about politicians in mainstream media have been 
identified as crucial antecedents of  political trust 
above and beyond partisanship (Levi & Stoker, 
2000). Finally, strong links between partisanship 
and trust were most often found in countries 
marked by a biparty system, leading to stronger 
representations of  “us” versus “them” and inter-
party conflicts—as it occurs most of  the time in 
the USA (see aforementioned research). However, 
in countries with multiparty political systems, the 
impact of  partisanship is much less straightfor-
ward, as boundaries between parties are less 
marked and different parties often agree on spe-
cific issues (see e.g., Givens & Luedtke, 2005; Hix, 
1999; Johansson & Raunio, 2001). Recent 
research showed for example that levels of  
partisanship were much lower in several European 
countries (United Kingdom, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, and Italy) than in the USA (Huddy et al., 
2018). In sum, political trust is related to, but dis-
tinct from, political partisanship, and differently 
predicts a range of  political views and actions.
Indeed, political trust has been found to pre-
dict different outcomes, for example, increased 
institutionalised engagement (e.g., voting; 
Hooghe & Marien, 2013) and decreased noninsti-
tutionalised engagement (e.g., demonstrating; 
Kaase, 1999), as well as perceived severity of  
social events (Lalot et al., in press; Short, 1984). 
More relevant for our present purpose, political 
trust increases compliance with governmental 
demands and regulations (see Levi & Stoker, 
2000, for a review). For example, Marien and 
Hooghe (2011) identified a positive relationship 
between political trust and law-abiding attitudes, 
so that more (vs. less) trusting citizens are more 
(vs. less) supportive of  different laws and regula-
tions, and less (vs. more) permissive of  law-
breaking behaviour. Since people who feel more 
lenient towards law-breaking behaviour are more 
likely to engage in such behaviour (e.g., Kirchler 
et al., 2008), low political trust is likely to be asso-
ciated with lower compliance with laws (see also 
Tyler, 2001, 2006). Interestingly, others have 
shown that the positive impact of  political trust 
on compliance is especially apparent when laws 
do not align with citizens’ values or do not directly 
benefit their self-interest. For example, Rudolph 
and Evans (2005) found that political trust had a 
stronger positive effect on acceptance of  redis-
tributive policies amongst conservatives (who 
were ideologically more opposed to such meas-
ures) than amongst liberals. Hence, the role of  
trust is particularly important when citizens do 
not perceive these measures as benefiting their 
self-interest or relieving their concerns.
Recently, an interactive effect of  trust and 
concern on political intentions was proposed by 
Abrams and Travaglino (2018) with the aversion 
amplification hypothesis. The principle underly-
ing this hypothesis is that the effects of  concern 
are amplified when political trust is low. Abrams 
and Travaglino (2018) applied this to a context in 
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which British people’s willingness to vote for a 
political change (voting for Brexit), fuelled by 
high immigration concern, was amplified when 
political trust was low. However, in the present 
situation, we are interested in those who are 
unwilling to change, which would follow from 
low concern. In this case, it should be the combi-
nation of  low concern and low trust that antici-
pates a distinctive behavioural intention. We use 
the terminology of  distrustful complacency to 
represent this critical combination of  low trust 
(distrustful) and low concern (complacency). 
That is to say, when people are both personally 
complacent and distrustful of  the authority that 
is demanding behaviour change, they should be 
markedly less willing to comply.
In summary, we suggest that high political 
trust should be sufficient to sustain willingness to 
comply with pandemic-related governmental 
restrictions (see also Baum et al., 2009), regard-
less of  people’s personal level of  concern. 
Similarly, having a high level of  concern should 
be sufficient to motivate compliance even 
amongst those who feel distrustful of  their gov-
ernment. However, in the absence of  both con-
cern and trust, there should be a distinctively 
lower level of  willingness to comply, as people’s 
distrustful complacency gives them little reason 
for doing so.
The Present Study
This two-part study tested the hypothesised inter-
active impact of  concern and political trust on 
compliance with governmental restrictions 
related to the Covid-19 outbreak in two European 
countries: France and Italy. At Time 1 (T1), all 
participants (details in what follows) completed a 
first online survey where we measured their polit-
ical trust, concern, and willingness to comply 
with restrictions. A subsample of  participants 
was then recontacted approximately 1 week later 
to report to what extent they had complied with 
restrictions during that week. Hence, the study 
allowed us to test the effect of  concern and trust 
on willingness to comply, and to prospectively 
test self-reported compliance. In addition to this 
main hypothesis, we explored a second outcome 
at the Time 2 (T2) part of  the survey, that is, how 
participants evaluated noncompliant individuals. 
We controlled for political partisanship in all anal-
yses (see following lines) to better distinguish the 
role of  political trust and partisanship.
Current Political Situation in France and 
Italy
To better understand the effects of  political trust 
and its relation to political partisanship in this 
study, it is important to have in mind the current 
political situation in France and Italy. France is a 
unitary semipresidential constitutional republic, 
marked by a multiparty system with at least eight 
major parties or alliances of  parties represented 
in the government. Current President Emmanuel 
Macron was elected in 2017 as the leader of  the 
party The Republic Forward (La République en 
Marche). Macron founded The Republic Forward, 
which is considered a centrist and liberal party 
(Milner, 2017), when running in the 2016 presi-
dential elections. The Republic Forward currently 
holds a majority of  seats at the National Assembly 
(parliament). Other main parties include the 
Republicans (right), the Socialist Party (left), the 
National Rally (far right), La France Insoumise 
(far left), and Ecology Democracy Solidarity 
(proenvironmental/left). In France, the majority 
of  citizens are not affiliated to a political party. 
Any citizen registered to vote can cast their vote 
for any candidate on the political spectrum.
Italy is a unitary parliamentary republic. Just 
as France, it has a multiparty system with at 
least three major blocks: a centre-right coalition 
formed of  four parties, a centre-left coalition 
formed of  five parties (including the Democratic 
Party: Partito Democratico), and the Five Star 
Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle). Italy has been 
marked by fragmentation and instability leading 
to ever-changing coalitions; it has seen 61 gov-
ernments since the formation of  its democratic 
republic in 1946 (Pasquino, 2009), and two gov-
ernments already since the latest elections in 
March 2018. Current President Sergio Mattarella 
was elected in 2015 as an independent 
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supported by the centre-left coalition, although 
he was long affiliated with the Democratic Party 
(and previous variations of  it). Italian politics is 
also marked by the prominence of  the Five Star 
Movement, a populist, antiestablishment, and 
Eurosceptic party, which holds a third of  the 
seats in the parliament (despite their candidate 
losing the latest presidential election; Bordignon 
& Ceccarini, 2015). As a result, deputies strug-
gled to form a coalition in the two chambers of  
parliament (Chambers of  Deputies and Senate), 
resulting in a hung parliament from 2015 to 
2019 (“Italy’s President Thwarts,” 2018). After 
a dramatic motion of  no-confidence against the 
Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte, leading to his 
resignation in August 2019, parties finally man-
aged to agree on a coalition government and 
reappointed Giuseppe Conte as Prime Minister 
(BBC News, 2019). As in France, most Italian 
citizens are not affiliated to a specific political 
party.
In summary, the complex and multiparty 
nature of  the French and Italian political systems 
prevents political dichotomy and clear us-versus-
them perceptions. Agreement and disagreement 
with the president and parliament are subject to 
many more factors beyond partisanship and 
political identification.
Time 1
Data were collected between March 17 and 23, 
2020, at a time when both Italy and France were 
effectively under lockdown (Italy since March 10, 
and France since March 14). Between March 17 and 
23, the number of  cases in Italy rose from 31,500 to 
64,000 (and from 7,700 to 20,000 in France), and 
the number of  confirmed deaths rose from 2,500 to 
6,000 (and from 175 to 860 in France). Participants 
completed an online questionnaire. They indicated 
how concerned they were about the outbreak, how 
much they (dis)trusted their politicians, and how 
willing they were to comply with governmental 
restrictions. Finally, they reported demographics. All 
items are reported in Appendix A of  the supple-
mental material, as used in French and Italian and 
translated in English. Data is publicly available on 
the OSF repository of  the project (https://osf.
io/4ugq3).
Method
Participants. Participants were recruited on social 
media to complete an online survey (available in 
French and Italian). They were not remunerated 
but could enter a draw to win one of three Amazon 
vouchers worth €20.00. Psychology students from 
an Italian university also participated in exchange 
for course credit. The sample included 372 partici-
pants, of which 149 were French and 223 Italian 
(73 male, 285 female, and 14 undisclosed) of a 
mean age of 28.6 years (SD = 10.9). To approxi-
mate power, we ran a sensitivity power analysis on 
G*Power 3 (Faul et al., 2007), and adjusted the 
results to better estimate power for the hypothe-
sised simple effect (Giner-Sorolla, 2018). This indi-
cated that the sample size was sufficient to detect a 
medium-size simple effect (d = 0.56) at 80% 
power. No observation was excluded from any 
analysis. We initially tested for effects of age and 
gender included as covariates in the model. How-
ever, their inclusion did not change the findings; 
hence, we do not discuss these variables further.1
Measures
Concern. Five items measured people’s con-
cern related to the outbreak (e.g., “How worried 
are you about the evolution of  the coronavirus 
pandemic in the upcoming weeks?”) and were 
aggregated in an average score (α = .82). All 
items were measured on a 5-point scale (1 = not 
at all, 5 = very much), and all descriptive statistics 
are reported in Table 1.
Political trust. Ten items measured political 
trust. Five were specific to the Covid-19 outbreak 
(e.g., “The [French/Italian] government can be 
trusted to make the right decisions about how 
best to handle the coronavirus pandemic”) and 
five concerned general trust (e.g., “Most mem-
bers of  the parliament are honest”), including 
items from Abrams and Travaglino (2018). Items 
were aggregated into a single average score (1 = 
strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; α = .80).
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Political partisanship. To better distinguish the 
role of  political trust and mere partisanship, we 
measured and controlled for political partisan-
ship. Participants were asked to rank the different 
national parties or coalitions of  parties in their 
order of  preference, from the one they identify 
with the most to the one they identify with the 
least. We used the ranking of  the party currently 
in office as an index of  affiliation with the “main 
party,” or partisanship (France: The Republic For-
ward; Italy: Democratic Party).2 Overall, 20% of  
French and 40% of  Italian respondents ranked 
the main party as 1 (out of  seven choices; MFR = 
3.44, SD = 1.83; MIT = 2.40, SD = 1.64). For 
the main analyses, we reverse-coded the ranking so 
that higher scores represented greater partisanship.
Willingness to comply with governmental restric-
tions. Three items measured how important partici-
pants felt it was to respect governmental restrictions, 
and how much they intended to do so themselves 
(e.g., “How much do you personally intend to 
respect any restrictions imposed by the govern-
ment?”; 1 = not at all, 5 = extremely; α = .86).
Results and Discussion
Since the dependent measure was not normally dis-
tributed but skewed to the left (skewness = −3.15, 
SE = 0.13; kurtosis = 14.6, SE = 0.25),  we relied on 
a generalised rather than least squares (LS) linear 
model (gamma probability distribution; log link func-
tion). To account for potential differences between 
the two countries, we included country as a covariate 
in the model while also accounting for political parti-
sanship. We tested the model in two steps, introduc-
ing first the main predictors (concern and political 
trust, both standardised, and their interaction), then 
adding country (−1 = Italy, 1 = France) and political 
partisanship (standardised) as covariates. Results are 
reported in Table 2.
There was a main effect of  country, so that 
Italian respondents (M = 4.73, SD = 0.53) 
were more willing to comply with restrictions 
than French respondents (M = 4.67, SD = 
0.54). Main effects of  concern and political 
trust were both significant, so that willingness 
to comply increased when political trust 
increased and when concern increased. Political 
partisanship, in contrast, did not affect compli-
ance. More importantly, the expected Concern 
× Political Trust interaction was significant, 
regardless of  whether country and partisanship 
were included in the model (see Figure 1).
Decomposition of  simple effects revealed that, 
amongst participants higher on concern (+1 SD), 
willingness to comply with restrictions was 
extremely high and did not depend on level of  
Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlations between concern, political trust, political partisanship, and 
willingness to comply with governmental restrictions.
Pearson’s correlations
 M (SD) 2 3 4 5
1 Concern 4.24 (0.67) .09 .50*** .12* −.37***
2 Political trust 3.23 (0.61) .15** .38*** −.11*
3 Compliance 4.70 (0.53) .06 −.05
4 Political partisanship 5.19 (1.79) −.28***
5 Country −1 = IT, 1 = FR  
Note. Political partisanship represents the ranking of the current national presidential party (out of 7), a higher score represents 
stronger preference for the party (7-point scale). Concern, political trust, and compliance were measured on a 5-point scale. IT 
= Italy; FR = France.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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political trust, b = −0.01, SE = 0.03, β = −.02, 
t(368) = −0.39, p = .70, Cohen’s d = −0.04, 95% 
CI [−0.25, 0.16]. In contrast, amongst participants 
lower on concern (−1 SD), willingness to comply 
decreased when political trust decreased, b = 0.13, 
SE = 0.03, β = .25, t(368) = 3.90, p < .001, d = 
0.41, 95% CI [0.20, 0.61]. Put differently, amongst 
participants low on political trust (−1 SD), there 
was a strong positive link between concern and 
willingness to comply, b = 0.32, SE = 0.03, β = 
.60, t(368) = 10.60, p < .001, d = 1.10, 95% CI 
[0.89, 1.32], which halved amongst participants 
high on political trust (+1 SD), b = 0.18, SE = 
0.04, β = .33, t(368) = 4.78, p < .001, d = 0.50, 
95% CI [0.29, 0.71]. These results are consistent 
with our hypothesis that either high concern or 
high trust should be sufficient to induce high will-
ingness to comply with governmental restrictions, 
but that willingness would be significantly reduced 
if  both concern and trust were low.
Time 2
At Time 2 (T2), we examined the second key 
dependent variable to conduct a prospective test of  
the distrustful complacency hypothesis on self-
reported behaviour. We recontacted the sample of  
Italian students 1 week after T1 to assess their 
actual (self-reported) compliance with restrictions. 
Data were collected between March 31 and April 3, 
2020. The country was still in lockdown and went 
from 106,000 to 120,000 cases (and from 12,400 to 
14,700 deaths). As compared to T1, the progres-
sion of  the pandemic had slowed down but was still 
an ongoing threat. Participants completed a brief  
online questionnaire, reporting to what extent they 
had complied with governmental restrictions dur-
ing the past week.
It could be argued that the measure of  willing-
ness to comply at T1 and perhaps self-reported 
behaviour at T2 might both be affected by social 
desirability bias because of  their direct and 
explicit wording. Participants might be reluctant 
to admit they do not intend to fully comply with 
restrictions. Therefore, at T2, we introduced a 
measure of  evaluation of  noncompliant individu-
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that individuals who show distrustful compla-
cency should be motivated to bolster their self-
concept indirectly, which could be done by 
showing evaluative favourability towards others 
who share their own orientation (see research on 
the egocentric bias motive; Clement & Krueger, 
2002; Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Thus, a self-
protection motive would make them more lenient 
towards the noncompliant target (Shaver, 1970). 
We explored the effect of  political trust and con-
cern (measured at T1) on this evaluation at T2. 
After these measures, participants were also pre-
sented with different media excerpts and com-
pleted further measures which are beyond the 
scope of  the present paper.
Method
Participants. Data from T1 and T2 were matched 
based on unique codes indicated by participants 
at both phases. There were 130 completed and 
usable questionnaires (nine male, 121 female; 
Mage = 22.6, SD = 6.30); 7 other responses were 
lost due to error in code reporting and impossi-
bility to match pre- and postdata. A sensitivity 
power analysis indicated that the sample size was 
sufficient to detect a small to medium interaction 
effect (d = 0.50) at 80% power.
Measures
Self-reported compliant behaviour. Participants were 
reminded of  the current governmental restric-
tions (“severe restrictions on the free movement 
of  people except for valid reasons linked to work 
and health”). They were then asked, “Please think 
about your behaviour in the last week. In all hon-
esty, how much did you comply with the govern-
ment’s restrictions?” (1 = not at all, 5 = very much; 
M = 4.73, SD = 0.49). Responses were positively 
correlated with willingness to comply with restric-
tions measured at T1, r(128) = .33, p < .001.
Evaluation of noncompliant individuals. Partici-
pants evaluated “citizens who do not comply 
with governmental restrictions” on a semanti-
cal differential scale (1 = negatively, 7 = positively; 
M = 1.48, SD = 1.25).
Results
Main hypothesis: Self-reported compliant behav-
iour. A generalised linear model (GLM) explored 
Figure 1. Willingness to comply with governmental restrictions related to the Covid-19 outbreak as a function 
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Note. Scores are estimated at −1 and +1 standard deviation of each standardised variable.
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how political concern, trust, and their interac-
tion (measured at T1) predicted self-reported 
compliant behaviour 1 week later (T2).4 Results, 
reported in detail in Table 3, showed a main 
effect of  concern as well as the expected Con-
cern × Trust interaction. Participants who had 
previously reported the lowest willingness to 
comply with restrictions (i.e., those showing 
distrustful complacency) consistently reported 
the lowest levels of  compliant behaviour (see 
Figure 2). Decomposition of  simple effects 
showed that compliant behaviour was lower 
amongst these participants as compared to 
those low on political trust but high on con-
cern, b = 0.34, SE = 0.12, β = .46, t(126) = 
2.77, p = .006, d = 0.49, 95% CI [0.14, 0.85], 
as well as compared to those low on concern 
but high on political trust, b = 0.32, SE = 
0.15, β = .53, t(126) = 2.08, p = .039, d = 
0.37, 95% CI [0.02, 0.72]. Participants high on 
concern reported high compliance regardless 
of  their level of  political trust, b = −0.09, SE 
= 0.07, β = −.14, t(126) = −1.19, p = .24, 
d = −0.21, 95% CI [−0.56, 0.14]. Finally, par-
ticipants high on trust reported high compli-
ance regardless of  their level of  concern, b = 
−0.06, SE = 0.11, β = −.09, t(126) = −0.58, p 
= .56, d = −0.10, 95% CI [−0.45, 0.25]. Hence, 
the longitudinal data supported the predicted 
relationship from political trust and concern to 
self-reported compliant behaviour.
Evaluation of noncompliant citizens. We then 
explored how political trust and concern (meas-
ured at T1) predicted evaluations of  noncompliant 
citizens (GLM analysis).5 Results, reported in Table 
3, indicated that evaluations were a function of  the 
hypothesised Concern × Political Trust interaction 
(see Figure 2). Consistent with previous results, 
participants showing distrustful complacency 
evaluated the noncompliant individuals less nega-
tively. Decomposition of  simple effects showed 
that evaluations were less negative amongst these 
participants as compared to those low on political 
trust but high on concern, b = −0.78, SE = 0.31, 
β = −.41, t(121) = −2.52, p = .013, d = −0.46, 
95% CI [−0.82, −0.10], as well as compared to 
those low on concern but high on political trust, 
b = −0.91, SE = 0.39, β = −.60, t(121) = −2.35, 
 p = .021, d = −0.43, 95% CI [−0.78, −0.07]. Par-
ticipants high on concern reported very negative 
evaluations regardless of  their level of  political 
trust, b = 0.02, SE = 0.18, β = .01, t(121) = 0.11, 
p = .91, d = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.34, 0.38]. Finally, 
participants high on trust reported very negative 
evaluations regardless of  their level of  concern, 
 b = 0.15, SE = 0.28, β = .08, t(121) = 0.52, p = 
.60, d = 0.09, 95% CI [−0.26, 0.45].
Table 3. Results of the generalised linear model testing the effect of concern, political trust, and their 
interaction (measured at T1) on self-reported compliant behaviour and evaluation of noncompliant individuals 
(T2).
b (SE) 95% CI of b Wald’s χ2(1) p value
Self-reported compliant behaviour
Intercept 1.54 (0.01) [1.52, 1.56] 18,820 < .001
Concern 0.03 (0.02) [0.002, 0.06] 4.26 .039
Political trust 0.03 (0.02) [−0.01, 0.06] 2.80 .094
Concern × Trust −0.05 (0.02) [−0.090, −0.003] 4.32 .038
Likelihood ratio χ2(3) = 7.53, p = .057
Evaluation of noncompliant individuals
Intercept 0.45 (0.06) [0.34, 0.56] 64.80 < .001
Concern −0.18 (0.07) [−0.32, −0.04] 6.05 .014
Political trust −0.23 (0.08) [−0.38, −0.09] 9.81 .002
Concern × Trust 0.21 (0.11) [0.01, 0.42] 4.15 .042
Likelihood ratio χ2(3) = 15.80, p = .001
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General Discussion
This study investigated willingness to comply 
with governmental restrictions in the context of  
the Covid-19 outbreak. Data were collected in 
France and Italy at a time when the population in 
both countries had been put under full lockdown. 
In line with previous findings in political and 
social psychology, we found that concern and 
political trust together predicted people’s willing-
ness to comply with governmental restrictions. 
Specifically, results showed that compliance was 
not a simple additive effect of  trust and concern. 
Willingness to comply was markedly lower when 
both trust and concern were low (i.e., a distrustful 
complacency effect) than if  either was high. 
Thus, people are ready to comply with strict regu-
lations restricting some of  their constitutional 
rights either because they are highly concerned 
about the issue at stake or because they trust the 
political institutions responsible for enacting 
these regulations. However, if  strategies fail to 
engage both concern and trust, it is markedly 
likelier that individuals will not comply. Political 
partisanship, although positively related to politi-
cal trust, was mostly unrelated to compliance, 
which highlights that political trust—at least in 
complex multiparty systems like France and 
Italy—cannot be reduced to mere partisanship.
The present research makes several contribu-
tions. First, the data were collected at a unique time 
point in the course of  the pandemic, when we 
were able to capture citizens’ representations of  
the pandemic while they were experiencing a full 
national lockdown. Data gathering in two different 
countries is another strength. Despite differences 
in the overall level of  political trust and concern, 
and a tendency for Italian respondents to be more 
willing to comply overall, the expected interactive 
effect of  concern and political trust held in both 
countries, which effectively demonstrates the repli-
cability of  the finding and its generalisability across 
linguistic and cultural differences. This increases 
our confidence that the effects of  distrustful com-
placency transcend national characteristics.
Consistent with our expectations, the evidence 
on self-reported behaviour 1 week later strength-
ens the findings, implying that distrustful compla-
cency does indeed affect subsequent compliant 
behaviour. Moreover, participants’ evaluation of  
noncompliant targets closely followed their own 
Figure 2. Self-reported compliant behaviour (left) and evaluation of noncompliant citizens (right) measured at 
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Note. Scores are estimated at −1 and +1 standard deviation of each standardised variable.
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self-reported (non)compliant behaviour, with the 
least compliant participants (combining low lev-
els of  concern and trust) reporting the less nega-
tive evaluation of  the noncompliant target. This 
is consistent with our assumption that noncom-
pliant individuals may be motivated to bolster 
their own self-concept by showing greater 
endorsement of  other noncompliers. It is inter-
esting to note that political trust produced effects 
even though the lockdown measures were man-
datory and legally enforced, and citizens risked 
fines or even imprisonment for refusing to com-
ply with it. We can speculate that the effects 
would be even stronger in contexts where com-
pliance is not as strongly enforced and depends 
solely on citizens’ cooperation, such as the cases 
of  Japan and Sweden at the time of  writing (e.g., 
Henley & Pilkington, 2020). In such contexts, it 
might also be useful to consider the impact of  
self-efficacy, as citizens could be reluctant to 
comply if  they believe the efforts requested from 
them are futile.
Some limitations should be considered. First, 
the correlational design of  the study limits a causal 
interpretation of  the results. The longitudinal rela-
tion between the main predictors (measured at 
T1) and self-reported compliant behaviour (meas-
ured at T2 1 week later) supports the directionality 
of  the effect, but direct observation of  behaviour 
would have provided even stronger confirmation. 
Nonetheless, given that intentions and behaviour 
measured proximally tend to be highly correlated 
(Webb & Sheeran, 2006), there is some justifica-
tion for confidence about the interpretation of  
the data. A different approach would have been to 
experimentally manipulate trust or concern but in 
the context of  the pandemic, this would have 
breached ethical standards and might have even 
caused some individuals to become psychologi-
cally distressed or to behave noncompliantly. It 
remains for further studies to test the causal chain 
more extensively. Second, rates of  willingness to 
comply and self-reported compliance were quite 
high, resulting in a potential ceiling effect on the 
measured variables. However, we believe this 
reflects the reality of  the situation in both coun-
tries in March when compliance with lockdown 
measures was very high (and legally required; see 
e.g., YouGov, 2020). In addition, our interest was 
not in who does comply but in who does not. The 
present data show that the combined impact of  
the two effects of  political trust and concern 
increases as one gets further from the ceiling, driv-
ing the empirically observed interaction. As we 
enter a period of  increasing mistrust (amongst 
some) and lack of  concern (amongst some), we 
would anticipate increasingly dangerous ways that 
compliance might be inhibited. This makes the 
present finding both important and timely.
We believe the value of  the evidence lies in the 
insight it provides into how individuals’ subjec-
tive perception of  trust and concern is likely to be 
implicated in their willingness to comply with 
governmental restrictions. In particular, we have 
identified that distrustful complacency might be 
an important reason why some individuals do not 
comply. Thus, two basic strategies present them-
selves, one is to try to ensure that even amongst 
those who distrust the government, concern is 
sufficiently high to mitigate that distrust. The 
other is to try to ensure that even those who feel 
unconcerned have sufficient trust in the motives 
and competence of  their government that they 
continue to comply. A third strategy is to identify 
areas, communities, or groups that, for whatever 
reasons, may be showing distrustful complacency, 
in order to implement more intense efforts to 
secure their compliance.
How feasible are these different strategies? 
First, it is arguable that trying to increase the gen-
eral population’s level of  concern in such a con-
text is neither practical nor wise. A large body of  
research in health psychology indeed shows that 
high levels of  concern or fear can produce unex-
pected boomerang effects and resistance to 
behaviour change, as people engage in fear con-
trol mechanisms in order to cope with the threat 
instead of  trying to address its cause (see e.g., 
Witte & Allen, 2000). Hence, if  one wanted to 
bolster compliance through increased concern, 
one would have to carefully aim for a reasonable 
level of  concern and make sure this is accompa-
nied with strong feelings of  efficacy (Peters et al., 
2013), to avoid provoking panic behaviour or 
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defensive reactance and denial (Witte, 1994). 
Second, it is generally assumed that political trust 
builds over time and may not be susceptible to 
short-term changes (Levi & Stoker, 2000). 
However, there is evidence that people’s opinion 
of  their leaders can change dramatically in times 
of  crisis. Citizens “look to their leaders for 
actions, solutions to the crisis, and for explana-
tions that will help them to interpret and respond 
to perceived threats and uncertainties” (Hasel, 
2013, p. 265), and so tend to look for strong lead-
ership in tough times. Hence, trust will likely 
depend, on the short term, on how adequate citi-
zens perceive the governmental response to the 
crisis to be. Opinion polls suggest this has indeed 
been the case. For example, an opinion survey 
conducted in Italy during the first half  of  March 
2020 revealed that trust in the authorities was 
much higher than a few months before the out-
break started, with 92% of  respondents evaluat-
ing the lockdown measures as appropriate and 
justified, and 78% evaluating the government as 
competently handling the crisis (Falcone et al., 
2020). It then becomes an issue of  communica-
tion strategies (see Rufai & Bunce, 2020); govern-
ments are likely to inspire higher trust by 
communicating a clear and sensible action plan, 
and globally conveying an image of  competence, 
motivation, and legitimacy (something that Italian 
Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte seemed to have 
mastered; see e.g., De Luca, 2020). In addition, 
evidence from focus groups suggests that 
“involving nonpoliticians in plan development 
and enforcement of  response plans without 
undue influence from interest groups” (Baum 
et al., 2009, p. 10) would increase citizens’ trust in 
the governmental decisions and increase their 
compliance with them.
Overall, however, a positive implication of  the 
present research is that the threshold for compli-
ance can be achieved through at least two routes. 
This threshold might well be higher in the case of  
less life-threatening contexts than the Covid-19 
pandemic, but we imagine that similar principles 
will apply. More broadly, consistent with the aver-
sion amplification hypothesis is the conclusion 
that it is not trust or concern alone that are 
associated with extreme or potentially disruptive 
behaviour, but their interactive combination. The 
present evidence shows that a further manifesta-
tion of  this, with significant implications for pub-
lic health, is distrustful complacency.
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Notes
1. A GLM analysis including concern, political trust, 
and their interaction, as well as country, age, and 
gender, revealed a main effect of  age, so that 
younger participants were more willing to comply 
with restrictions, b = −0.02, SE = 0.01, 95% CI 
[−0.03, −0.004], Wald’s χ2(1) = 6.72, p = .010. 
There was no main effect of  gender, b = 0.01, SE 
= 0.01, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.03], Wald’s χ2(1) = 0.12, 
p = .73. Moreover, the Concern × Political Trust 
interaction remained significant with the inclusion 
of  these covariates, b = −0.01, SE = 0.01, 95% 
CI [−0.03, −0.002], Wald’s χ2(1) = 5.19, p = .023.
2. Given the important role of  the Five Stars 
Movement in the Italian Parliament, we consid-
ered using the rating of  this party as an additional 
index of  partisanship for Italian participants. 
There were, however, several disadvantages in 
doing so, since partisanship would then be con-
sidered in relation to two (quite opposite) par-
ties in Italy versus one single party in France. 
In addition, zero-order correlations revealed 
that Five Stars Movement partisanship was not 
related to political trust, r(221) = −.02, p = 
.74, whereas Democratic Party partisanship was, 
r(221) = .26, p < .001, as was The Republic 
Forward partisanship in France, r(147) = .49, 
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p < .001. It seems that by its populist, antiestab-
lishment nature, the Five Star Movement is quali-
tatively different from the other parties. We hence 
decided to focus our measure of  Italian partisan-
ship on the Democratic Party.
3. In addition to the evaluation of  noncompli-
ant citizens, we also included an item measur-
ing evaluation of  compliant citizens, defined 
as “citizens who comply with governmental 
restrictions.” Order of  the two questions was 
counterbalanced. However, both measures were 
very strongly correlated, r(125) = −.72, p < 
.001, and actually mirrored each other. To avoid 
redundancy, we only present results on the evalu-
ation of  noncompliant citizens. Analyses on the 
evaluation of  compliant citizens (yielding a sym-
metrical Political Trust × Concern interaction) 
are reported in Appendix B of  the supplemental 
material for information purposes.
4. When entered in the analysis as a predictor of  
self-reported compliant behaviour, political par-
tisanship produced no main effect, b = −0.003, 
SE = 0.01, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.02], Wald’s χ2(1) 
= 0.07, p = .79, nor did it impede the Concern 
× Trust interaction, which remained significant, 
b = −0.05, SE = 0.02, 95% CI [−0.09, −0.001], 
Wald’s χ2(1) = 4.11, p = .043.
5. When entered in the analysis as a predictor of  the 
evaluation of  noncompliant citizens, political par-
tisanship produced a main effect, b = 0.19, SE = 
0.06, 95% CI [0.06, 0.31], Wald’s χ2(1) = 8.51, p 
= .004, showing that participants more strongly 
identified with the main party (Democratic Party) 
evaluated noncompliant citizens more positively. 
The Concern × Trust interaction fell just short 
of  significance when partisanship was included, 
although the direction of  the effect remained the 
same, b = 0.20, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [−0.02, 0.41], 
Wald’s χ2(1) = 3.14, p = .076.
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